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Odey: Great Disaster

Great Disaster: The Impact of Civil War and COVID-19 on Yemen
When the Arab Spring started in 2011, Yemen was one of the countries that revolted
against its government. The Arab Spring created a pathway for a civil war that started in 2015
and is still ongoing. The Yemen crisis has hit its citizens hard and has resulted in a great number
of casualties. Hundreds of thousands have lost their lives due to the civil war and many have
been displaced from their homes. Food insecurity has risen as a result of the war and the number
of Yemenis who are at risk of starvation is estimated to be 8.4 million.1 Before the civil war, the
Yemen Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate stood at 12.7%.2 GAM rates show the nutritional
status of a given population and are used to determine the seriousness of a humanitarian crisis.3
After the start of the war, Yemen's GAM rate rose above the global emergency level of 15%,
with some areas in Yemen reaching a 30% GAM rate.4 The country’s food crisis left many
women and children impoverished and without food or clean water to care for. In its already
fragile state, Yemen is also experiencing the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic is causing
more harm to the country by worsening instability and fragility in an environment already
ravished by war. Among its various challenges are food shortages, disease outbreaks, damaged
infrastructures and a collapsed healthcare system. Current reports show that COVID-19 has
further escalated the alarming issues Yemen is currently facing. But due to chaotic situation, it is
difficult to know the actual impact of the pandemic on the country.
Background of the Crisis
In 2014, a civil war broke out in Yemen when the Houthis, an Islamic group based in
Northern Yemen, took control of the capital Sana’a.5 In early 2015, the Houthi movement
expanded southward from the capital to Aden on the coast of the Arabian sea.6 The expansion of
the Houthis led to Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansor Hadi fleeing to Saudi Arabia in March
2015 and calling for intervention from other countries.7 This made Saudi Arabia assemble many
of its Arab partners, including Bahrain, Qatar, and Egypt, and initiated a military attack to restore
Hadi’s regime and remove Houthi fighters from the capital and other major Yemeni cities.8 The
civil war is not binary (i.e. Saudi-led army vs the Houthis) as multiple fighters are involved, and
their alliances have been somewhat fluid.9 Iran is also in the mist of the Yemen crisis. There
have been allegations of Iran supporting the Houthis although Iran has vehemently denied the
allegations. Countries such as the United States and Saudi Arabia have accused Iran of
smuggling advanced weapons such as rockets launchers and missiles into Yemen which is a
violation of the United Nations arms embargo.10 The involvement of Iran and Saudi Arabia in
1
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Yemen has created a proxy war between the two regional powers. This can be likened to the cold
war between the United States and Soviet Union. The regional struggle for dominance and
influence between Iran and Saudi Arabia amid the Yemen crisis is as a result of religious divides
which regrettable informs persuasions and beliefs in Islam. The two countries follow one of two
main branches in Islam. Majority of Shia Muslims are in Iran while Saudi Arabia views itself as
a leading Sunni Muslim power.11 Al-Qaeda has also benefited from the war in Yemen, as they
have increased their influence by providing security and public service to Yemenis in some
areas.12 Moreover, in the summer of 2019, long-boiling tensions between the internationally
recognized Republic of Yemen and the secessionist Southern Transitional Council resulted in
open warfare between the local allies, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Although
both the Republic of Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council have agreed to share power
in a coalition government, periodic clashes continued in 2020.
Following the outbreak of war, hundreds of thousands have lost their lives in Yemen,
resulting in one of the worst humanitarian crises currently known in modern times. The war has
left Yemen with significantly damaged infrastructures. For example, medical and water
infrastructures have been hit during military strikes nearly 200 times since the intensification of
the political conflict in Yemen. Data from the United States and European funded organizations
as well as the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), estimate that “as of
November 2020 over 130,000 Yemenis have been killed since 2015.”13 Current estimates place
the number of Yemenis in need of humanitarian assistance at around 22 million, with eight
million at risk of famine and more than one million affected by the cholera outbreak.14
The United States saw the involvement of Al-Qaeda in the war as a new dimension to the
security challenges in the region. First, it threatened America’s interest in the region. Second, it
is also seen as a threat to the vested interest of the West in the region. Third, a threat against
Saudi Arabia- United States main ally in the region is also considered as a direct threat to the U.S
national security interest. Thus, the U.S became indirectly involved in Yemen through arms sales
to Saudi Arabia, a development that raised concerns about more civilian casualties. Although the
Houthis are of no direct threat to the U.S, their attacks on Saudi Arabia’s infrastructure and
territories constituted a threat to the Saudis who are important allies of the U.S.15 This led to the
U.S support for Saudi Arabia. Human Rights Watch berated the U.S for its involvement in the
war.
On February 4th, 2021, President Biden announced that the U.S will no longer be
supporting offensive operations in Yemen.16 This follows the U.S assessment of human rights
abuses and humanitarian crisis from the war. The withdrawal of U.S support includes halting
weapon sales and providing logistic support to Saudi Arabia.17 . However, ending support of
Jonathan Marcus, “Why Saudi Arabia and Iran are bitter rivals.” BBC, September 16, 2019.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42008809
12
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offensive operations will not end U.S defensive support to Saudi Arabia or the strategic fight
against terrorism and its agents like Al-Qaeda in the region.
How the Civil War and COVID-19 has impacted Yemen’s Health Sector
For several years, the Yemen crisis has been considered one of the worst humanitarian
crises in the world, and public health experts have warned that the coronavirus pandemic will
harm Yemen’s already weakened population.18 Many healthcare experts fear that due to the civil
war, the COVID-19 pandemic would have a devastating impact because approximately 50% of
Yemen’s population is already in dire need of healthcare services.19 Specific health concerns that
the country has been facing include high malnutrition rates and high infant and maternal
mortality rates.20 Additionally, Yemen suffers from inadequate sanitation, as many live in
crowded homes with limited access to clean drinking water. The social stigmatization of
COVID-19 also creates hindrances for an effective response to the pandemic in the country.21
There is much fear of contracting COVID-19, and the stigma of contracting the virus and
spreading it prevents people from coming to the hospital.22 They instead stayed at home even
when they needed medical treatments.23
As a result of the ongoing civil war, it is very challenging to establish efficient COVID19 testing facilities. Yemen has six central public laboratories for testing COVID-19 in major
cities such as Sana’a, Aden, Mukalla, Taiz, Hodeida, and Ibb.24 Out of these six cities, only four
can carry out testing for the virus under the supervision of the World Health Organization
(WHO) due to a shortage of medical staff.25 Many medical professionals involved in the testing
are underpaid or not paid at all.26 These four laboratories have provided medical staff with the
technical training and standard procedures that are needed to administer the tests.27 Therefore,
this means that Yemen is wholly dependent on limited resources supported by the WHO, and the
best-case scenario will be testing only a small number of highly suspected cases.28 There is also a
lack of access to personal protective equipment, like masks.29 Lack of funding coupled with
shortages in protective equipment has forced many healthcare professionals to leave their duty
posts, a development that has forced many health centers to be shut down.30

Sharp, “Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention”
Ali Ahmed Al-Waleed et al., “The first 2 months of the SARS-CoV-2 Epidemic in Yemen: Analysis of
the Surveillance Data”. PLoS ONE, 15 no. 10 (October 2020): 1-13. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241260.
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There has also been a blockage of humanitarian aid in Yemen. Millions of Yemenis have
been suffering due to the restriction of aid by Yemeni government officials and the Houthis.31
For instance, between March 2015 and March 2021, the Mwatan Organization for Human Rights
recorded at least 274 incidents of obstruction of aid by the Houthis.32 These blockages have not
only obstructed aid to those in need but have contributed significantly to the limited number of
available laboratories for tackling the pandemic in Yemen.33 The Human Rights Watch also
reported that as of 2021, the Houthis have suppressed information about the dangers and impact
of COVID-19 and they have undermined efforts by the international community to distribute
vaccines to territories under their control.34 They have actively spread disinformation about the
virus and vaccines, making it difficult to effectively fight the pandemic.35 Frequent power
outages affect the performance of the laboratories and compromise results.36 Moreover, large
portions of roads in Yemen have been destroyed by bombs, which in turn limits the
transportation of supplies to the laboratories.37
Limited resources have made testing for the virus difficult; nonetheless, there has been a
high number of reported cases in the country. On April 10, 2020, Yemen confirmed its first
COVID-19 case.38 According to Looi, “Official figures put the number of confirmed cases at
over 1600, with nearly 500 deaths—a mortality rate of 27%, which is one of the highest in the
world and five times the global average.”39 The WHO stated that the number of confirmed
COVID-19 cases and deaths in Yemen for May 23, 2021, was 6653 and 1305 respectively.40 The
WHO also stated that its seroprevalence study suggested that the number of confirmed cases is
much higher.41 The number of confirmed cases and deaths from January 3 to June 28, 2021, are
6908 and 1360 respectively.42 A 2020 study revealed a 57% hospitalization rate in Yemen’s
southern and eastern parts within the first 2 months after the confirmation of COVID-19 cases.43
This study further showed that 63% of deaths from COVID-19 were individuals younger than 60
years old.44 The percentage of serious cases that needed hospital admission in Yemen was more
than double the number of cases reported in many other countries, such as Iran whose
approximated percentage was 20%.45 Many COVID-19 cases were not connected to a clear mode
of transmission and were classified as COVID-19 infections with no clear source of origin. As a
31

Ibid.
Martin Gak, “Houthi Government: War won’t Stop Until Saudis Quit Yemen,” Deutsche Welle, April 15,
2021. https://www.dw.com/en/houthi-government-war-wont-stop-until-saudis-quit-yemen/a-57208060
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https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/01/yemen-houthis-risk-civilians-health-covid-19#
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The Bmj, July 27, 2020. doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m2997.
39
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41
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In view of the foregoing this, medical professionals in Yemen could not determine the pattern by
which the virus spread, thus making the pandemic difficult to contain.46As the pandemic began
to peak, satellite imagery showed that across Aden governorate in Yemen there were
approximately 1500 excess burial sites on July 6, 2020, and on September 19, 2020, the number
rose to 2120 during the first wave of the pandemic before waning.47 As of December 23, 2021,
Yemen reported 10,105 infections and 1,981 COVID-19 related death since the pandemic took
hold of the country.48 However, these numbers may be grossly underreported because of the
ongoing Civil War in the country. This matters because to effectively contain the pandemic
requires sufficient amount of resources including humans, financial, as well as reliable timely
data. Obviously, this has remained a challenge in Yemen because of its fragility. As a result,
policies to contain the spread of the virus have been ineffective. The Civil War has polarized the
country and has broken down supply chains. This means that relevant information, education on
containment measures and access to vaccines is inequitable.
A recent study done by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine projected
that up to 11 million people in Yemen could become infected, and deaths could be between
62,000 and 85,000 in an eventual worst-case scenario.49 Moreover, the virus has harmed
healthcare workers. As of 2020 at least 97 health workers, including infectious disease experts,
medical directors, midwives, pharmacists, and other crucial medical professionals, have all
reportedly lost their lives to the virus.50 The impact of every healthcare provider’s death has a
lasting effect on the population, as these deaths prevent treatment from reaching communities in
desperate need due to lack of access to health services.51 The implication of this is that a broken
healthcare system as the case with Yemen’s is ill equipped to respond to the significant health
and fiscal challenges posed by COVID 19 pandemic. The high level of fatality among health
workers is equally attributable to the same failure - collapse of the healthcare system. This
matters because the system may not be able to retain skilled hands neither would it be able to
attract new hire since the system does not guarantee adequate safety for frontline responders.
This could further exacerbate the crisis and lead to severe humanitarian challenge worse than
what has already been witnessed.
With the civil war preventing a coherence of pandemic management, COVID-19 could
result in long-term negative impacts on Yemen’s healthcare system. A major long-term issue that
will arise is the rebuilding and restructuring of medical care.52 Rebuilding and restructuring the
health sector of Yemen will not just require the funding of health facilities, but also the training
of new doctors.53 Also, there is a significant short-term health crisis created by the war. A section
46

Ibid.
Koumn Besson ES et al, “Excess Mortality During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Geospatial and
Statistical Analysis in Aden Governorate, Yemen BMJ Global Health, 6 no 3 (March 2021): 1-10.
https://gh.bmj.com/content/bmjgh/6/3/e004564.full.pdf
48
Reuter COVID-19 Tracker, “Yemen.” Updated, December 23, 2021. https://graphics.reuters.com/worldcoronavirus-tracker-and-maps/countries-and-territories/yemen/
49
Med Global, Project Hope, Center for Global Health at the University of Illinois, “A Tipping Point for Yemen
Health System: The Impact of Covid on a Fragile State Report,” 2020. Center for Global Health, Project
Hope. July 2020
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A-Tipping-Point-for-Yemen%E2%80%99s-HealthSystem072020.pdf.
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of the population without food has become malnourished with weaker immune systems, which
makes them more susceptible to COVID-19 complications. The COVID-19 situation in Yemen
could also redirect limited resources away from crucial healthcare responses to other deadly
diseases like cholera and dengue.54 Yemen’s healthcare system is moving closer to the brink of
collapse, and the impact on the Yemeni healthcare system has the potential to be catastrophic.
Impact of the Pandemic on Yemen’s Economy
COVID-19 has not only impacted Yemen’s healthcare system, but it's economy as well.
Yemen is among the poorest and least-developed countries in the world. It is estimated that
around 80% of Yemen’s population is below the poverty line.55 Before the civil war started, 90%
of its food and most of its medicinal and fuel necessities were imported.56 Yemen’s
unemployment rate was high and stood at 45% among youth.57 Before the civil war and the
COVID-19 pandemic, Yemen depended heavily on the exportation of oil and gas, with these
industries contributing almost 50% of the country’s foreign reserves and 50-60% of its public
budget financing.58 The loss of processed natural gas exports due to civil war caused a public
finance and liquidity crisis, and in 2016, this left most of Yemen’s 1.25 million public sector
employees and their 7 million dependents without a regular income.59
Yemen’s economy felt the impact of COVID-19 before any cases were confirmed due to
business closures in other countries as those nations sought to mitigate the pandemic. The flow
of remittances from Yemenis abroad contributes about 12.6% to the country’s GDP, and the
COVID-19’s disruption of the global economy caused a 95% fall in the number of remittances in
at least one exchange office in Northern Yemen.60 The World Bank in 2020 estimated that there
was a 19.6% decline in the inflow of remittances to Yemen.61 Hence, remittances from abroad
went down from $58 billion in 2019 to $47 billion in 2020. Yemen also took a fair share of the
worldwide disruptions and distortions of labor market demand because of the lockdown and
stay-at-home measures by various governments. Due to the reduction in remittances, poorer
Yemeni households became the most affected as they saw a 20% reduction in their annual
income.62
MedGlobal, Project Hope, Center for Global Health, “A Tipping Point for Yemen Health System: The
Impact of Covid on a Fragile State Report 2020.” 27
55
Mugaahed Abdu Kaid Saleh and Manjunath K. Rajappa, “Fighting COVID-19 in Yemen: The Role of
Public Administration and Readiness of Healthcare system.” Mukt Shabd Journal, 9 no. 6 (June 2020): 1459-1472.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mugaahed-Abdu-Kaid-Saleh/publication/342335589_Fighting_COVID19_in_Yemen_The_role_of_Public_Administration_and_Readiness_of_Healthcare_system/links/5eee2d7a92851ce
9e7f4a8b1/Fighting-COVID-19-in-Yemen-The-role-of-Public-Administration-and-Readiness-of-Healthcaresystem.pdf.
56
Sana’a Economic Unit, “Yemen Accelerating Economic Woes Amid During the COVID-19 Pandemic.”
Sana’a Center, October 2020. https://sanaacenter.org/files/Rethinking_Yemens_Economy_No7_En.pdf.
57
Ibid., 5.
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59
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60
Mugaheed Abdu Kaid Saleh, and Manjunath, K. Rajappa, “Small and Medium Enterprises in Yemen:
Navigating through Additional Obstacles During COVID-19”, 11th International Conference on Shifting Paradigm
in Business, Economy and Society: Vision 2050, Pacific University. September 2020.
61
Sana’a Economic Unit, “Yemen Accelerating Economic Woes Amid During the COVID-19 Pandemic,”
62
Dalia Elsabbagh, Sikandra Kurdi and Manfred Wiebelt. “Model: Impact of Falling Remittances Amid
COVID-19 on Yemen War Torn Economy.” IFPRI (blog). International Food Policy Research Institute, March 4,
2021. https://www.ifpri.org/blog/model-impact-falling-remittances-amid-COVID-19-yemens-war-torn-economy.
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The global lockdown mandates resulted in significant negative effects for the nation of
Yemen. For example, the slowdown in the inflow of imported goods led to price inflation.63 In
2020, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that due to the effects of COVID-19, oilexporting countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region will see a $224 billion
shortfall in revenue.64 Yemen is a country that is heavily dependent on oil exports, which make
up 70-80% of the government revenue.65 In 2020, the Yemeni government was expected to
export 30 million barrels of oil but due to a drastic fall in oil prices and the economic lockdowns
as a result of the pandemic, the government could not reach its goal.66 This situation created a
revenue shortfall and widened the financing gap, limiting government efforts to support small
business enterprises and the economy.67
The pandemic has, without a doubt, exacerbated the fragility of Yemen. Because of the
nation’s vulnerability, many believe that the pandemic will only worsen the humanitarian crisis.
Given its dependency on oil exports for revenue, government revenue will be limited, meaning
that a great economic downturn in Yemen is inevitable.
Recommendations for Yemen
Strengthen Yemen’s Electronic Integrated Disease Early Warning System (eIDEWS)
Various COVID-19 responses have been implemented in Yemen, one of which is an
Electronic Integrated Disease Early Warning System (eIDEWS). The eIDEWS is a health
facility-based surveillance system and it covers about 37% of Yemen’s health resources,
consisting of a network of nearly 200 health facilities spanning the whole country while
collecting data on as many as 28 diseases.68 The idea of a national surveillance system was
conceived in 2013 to help identify and prioritize infectious diseases; however, the system
collapsed as a result of the civil war and its functions were integrated into eIDEWS to ensure
effective data collection, analysis, and public health response.69 Currently, the system collects
data from sentinel sites by using mobile cellular software and sends the data to districts,
governorates, and central surveillance offices.70 It allows health workers to give early reports on

Saleh and Rajappa, “Small and Medium Enterprises in Yemen: Navigating through additional obstacles
during COVID-19,” 9,
64
Nader Itayim, “Covid-19 to Deal $224bn Blow to Mena Oil Exporters: IMF,” Argus, October 19, 2020,
https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2151443-covid19-to-deal-224bn-blow-to-mena-oil-exporters-imf.
65
Saleh and Rajappa, “Small and Medium Enterprises in Yemen: Navigating through additional obstacles
during COVID-19,” 9.
66
Ibid.
67
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68
World Health Organization, “Strengthening Yemen’s Disease Early Warning System During COVID-19
pandemic,” Accessed March 23, 2021. http://www.emro.who.int/pandemic-epidemic-diseases/news/strengtheningyemens-disease-early-warning-system-during-the-COVID-19pandemic.html#:~:text=eIDEWS%20is%20a%20health%20facility,outbreaks%20of%20priority%20infectious%20d
iseases.
69
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threats to public health.71 In 2019 it was revamped by adding a series of new and enhanced
reporting and automated output characteristics.72
One of the major challenges with the surveillance system is the timeliness of alerts, as a
study by Dureab found delays in the timely reporting of data.73 In this study, although a majority
of informants recognized the eIDEWS function of early detection of disease, they also
acknowledged that there was a delay in timely reporting.74In this study, eight participants stated
that the eIDEWS verification process of alerts was too slow when compared to required actions
for immediate alerts.75 This is problematic as it slows down the speed of response to public
health threats such as COVID-19.
Due to the global pandemic, the eIDEWS has undergone enormous strain and cannot
properly respond to the pandemic. The WHO is supporting Yemen through the Early Warning
Alert Response Network (EWARN).76 EWARN is an early disease warning system that
temporarily detects diseases during a humanitarian crisis.77 Through the EWARN project, the
WHO must prioritize ensuring rapid response to alerts of Yemen eIDEWS. This will help the
country respond well to COVID-19. As stated earlier, Yemen has no proper healthcare system in
place to properly absorb the impact of COVID-19. The Early Warning Alert Response Network
can fill this gap through collection of data, data management and analysis of the impact of the
pandemic. As a war-torn country with limited access to healthcare services, the EWARN is a
much-needed tool that could help the WHO officials and public health officials to properly
prepare appropriate response to the humanitarian crisis.
Increase the Preparedness Level for COVID-19
The level of preparedness for COVID-19 in Yemen is low. Lack of adaptive behaviors
such as social distancing, wearing masks, and handwashing by the population has harmed
Yemen’s level of preparedness toward COVID-19.78 Due to the ongoing civil war and lack of
medical staff, the risk communication system in Yemen is currently not effective in countering
the pandemic. However, there has been an effective coordination mechanism between
humanitarian partners through the national Health Cluster, a WHO program for organizing
humanitarian health responses. Humanitarian partners under the Health Cluster program are
currently preparing for a second wave and engaging with excluded/vulnerable groups to ensure
Mona Mayad, Reema Alysufi, Ali Assabri and Yousef Kahder. “An Electronic Disease Early Warning
System in Sana'a Governorate, Yemen: Evaluation Study.” JMIR public health and surveillance, 5 no. 4 (November
2019): 1-7. https://publichealth.jmir.org/2019/4/e14295/PDF.
72
World Health Organization, “Strengthening Yemen’s Disease Early Warning System During COVID-19
pandemic.”
73
Fekri Dureab et al., “Assessment of electronic Disease Early Warning System for Improved Disease
Surveillance and Outbreak Response in Yemen”. BMC Public Health 20, no. 1422 (September 2020).
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-020-09460-4.
74
Ibid., 6.
75
Ibid.
76
World Health Organization, “Strengthening Yemen’s Disease Early Warning System During COVID-19
pandemic.”
77
Center for Disease and Control, “Early Warning Alerts and Respond Network Put the Brakes on Deadly
Diseases,” August 12, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/healthprotection/fieldupdates/fall-2016/ewarn.html.
78
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Services, “Yemen: COVID-19
Preparedness and Monthly Report,” (January 2021), February 23, 2021. https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemenCOVID-19-preparedness-and-response-monthly-report-january-2021.
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that they are supported in their health facilities as they respond to COVID-19.79 The WHO will
need to ensure that it provides the necessary supplies to help increase the level of preparedness in
Yemen, and health partners should prioritize encouraging behavioral change such as social
distancing in the community. Moreover, these partners in 2021 will begin to promote COVID-19
vaccination by drawing on the global COVAX initiative.80 COVAX is a program that was
launched by the WHO, the European Union, and Gavi Vaccine Alliance in response to the global
pandemic.81 Making sure that vulnerable people in Yemen get vaccinated will help increase the
country’s level of preparedness for COVID-19. Since 2004, France has directly contributed to
the Gavi Vaccination Alliance.82 During the 2020 Global Vaccine Summit, France announced a
new €350 million contribution to Gavi.83 Out of the €350 million, €250 million was distributed
to Gavi Vaccine Alliance core programs and €100 million was allocated to the COVAX
initiative.84
As of June 27, 2021, 268,753 vaccine doses have been distributed in Yemen.85 To keep
these numbers up, the Yemeni government and other international organizations need to create a
safe model for vaccination rollout.86 To ensure the effective coverage of the vaccination
program, a strategy based on logistical consideration which segments and prioritizes the risk
group should be pursued to enhance efficiency and strengthen preparedness in the management
of the process.87
The implementation of special teams via WHO and the Yemeni government to coordinate
matters related to COVID-19 across many disciplines would be beneficial in keeping the nation
updated on COVID-19 protocols.88 Another way that the administration of Yemen can improve
its level of readiness to contain the pandemic and reduce more causalities is by making sure that
there is a strong collaboration with private healthcare providers. Hospital administrators will also
need to take the necessary steps that will ensure that medical staff are protected from the virus.89
Adoption of Human Rights-Based Response for COVID-19
Although government agencies should take preventive measures against COVID-19 in
various parts of Yemen, such measures and responses must respect basic human rights and
freedom. Such measures must be without discrimination. In times of conflicts and global
pandemics, citizens’ rights may be restricted due to public concerns. However, restrictions on
UNOCHA, “Yemen: COVID-19 Preparedness and Monthly Report,” (January 2021).
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citizens’ rights can also lead to authorities abusing their power. Some human rights concerns
during this humanitarian crisis are limits on freedom of expression, inadequate protection for
health workers, stigmatization and discrimination, and lack of protection of civil and community
societies.90 Government officials in Yemen should make sure that everyone has access to
treatment and is not denied because of their inability to pay or because of their background. The
international community must stand up to put an end to the human carnage in Yemen.
Additionally, the Yemeni government should mobilize and deploy military personnel to
provide escort to humanitarian organizations on ground in Yemen to distribute humanitarian aids
such as vaccines and other essentials to the population especially the most vulnerable. Pakistan
used military personnel as escort for vaccination teams during conflict.91 Yemen can do the same
with support from allies. This strategy can help ensure better access to the vaccines by the
population and ensure equal access to vaccines without discrimination. Any emergency measures
taken by the government must be necessary and proper so that fundamental human rights are not
denied. Humanitarian agencies stated that although the Yemeni government did not obstruct
them as much as the Houthis did, the government still interfered and significantly delayed their
work.92 The US blocked aid to Yemen because humanitarian assistance was taxed in areas that
were controlled by the Houthis.93 The crisis in Yemen has revealed harsh truths that the
international community has to accept. One of them is that the Houthis are strongly opposed to
the West and cannot be wished away. A way the U.S can engage in a direct dialogue with the
Houthis is by a new balanced U.N Security Council Resolution, condemning the blockade and a
call for an inclusive government.94 Due to the intricate nature of the Civil War in Yemen a
political solution to the chaos is not likely in the immediate future. A partition may be the best
path to peace and stability in Yemen as this will also help in the management of the pandemic.
There has been a historical precedent for two Yemen. Before its unification in 1990 there was a
Northern and Southern Yemen.95 Northern Yemen once existed as a separate theocratic Zaidi
rule and then in the second half of the 21st century it had an authoritarian Arab nationalist
government.96 The south on the other hand was a loose confederation of semi-independent
emirates under the British rule.97 Partition may be the best solution that could ensure stability in
the region and in turn help to effectively contain the impact of the pandemic as all the parties
involved would now have a voice in the management of affairs.
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Full Funding of the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan by Donor Governments
A humanitarian aid funding gap exists between the UN, NGO-led programs, and health
programs.98 For example, in June 2020, international governments at a donor conference pledged
to contribute only $1.35 billion to Yemen’s humanitarian aid program.99 Unfortunately, this
pledge fell more than $1 billion short of the $2.41 billion targets set by the UN, and it raised only
half of what was raised in 2019.100 Many aid organizations in Yemen have yet to see the pledge
materialize in the form of medical resources or other necessary humanitarian materials.101 As the
pandemic began to affect the global economy, many nations around the world decided to
concentrate on situations within their borders.102 Thus, international governments have only
contributed $1.43 billion of the $3.38 billion requested for the 2020 Yemen Humanitarian
Response Plan, meaning that less than 60% of the requirement for the Yemen Humanitarian
Response Plan has been met.103 To help Yemen contain the impact of the pandemic, donor
governments will need to increase the level of funding and meet their commitments to enable
help reach those who desperately require humanitarian aid.104 If donor governments do not
follow through on their pledges, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen could become much worse
than anticipated.105 Donor governments should also prioritize funding NGOs in Yemen that
support humanitarian and health workers, as a quicker channel of reaching the most
vulnerable.106
Reform UN Arms Trade Treaty
The UN needs to reform the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) if it hopes to bring an end to
the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. For more than five years, the UN ATT has been enforced and
it imposes strict rules that regulate the sales and transfer of international arms.107 The treaty was
designed to stop deadly weapons from getting into the hands of people who may use them to
violate human rights laws, which include genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.108
Both parties in the war have, at several points in time, violated the arms treaty.109 Despite
existing sanctions on the Houthis by the UN, the Houthis are still being supplied with weapons
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by Iran.110 The Saudi coalition, on the other hand, is being equipped with weapons by Western
states such as Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden.111 Additionally, the UK and the US are major
allies of Saudi Arabia, and in 2018, they contributed $237 million and $87 million respectively
in arms sales to the Saudi Coalition.112 Most Western countries including the UK and U.S who
once advocated for the ATT no longer abide by it thereby rendering it ineffective. Andrew
Smith, a spokesman for Campaign Against Arms stated that ATT has always had problems.113
One major issue with the UN ATT is that its text appears to be recommendatory, rather than
obligatory,114 and it also does not address the transfer of arms to non-state actors.115 The treaty is
too weak to hold members accountable and there is a need for a change and new approach
toward regulating the flow and transfer of arms. The new approach will be a major reform of the
existing ATT system. This will help reduce the humanitarian crisis that Yemen is experiencing
and put the country in a better position to fight the global pandemic.
Conclusion
Yemen is facing an unprecedented number of issues, including situations many have
called the worst humanitarian crisis of our time. The ongoing civil war brought Yemen to its
knees and the global pandemic will only worsen its economic, political, and health concerns.
Due to the ongoing humanitarian crisis, more than half of the population of Yemen greatly
depends on external humanitarian aid. Thus, the UN, US, and other international government
donors must commit to the Humanitarian Response Plan for Yemen so that the nation can
combat the impacts of the civil war and COVID-19. Regarding the COVID-19 response, health
workers in Yemen should be supplied protective equipment to ensure that they can deliver
treatment without concern for their health. The presented solutions will be crucial in helping
Yemen handle both the civil war and COVID-19 more efficiently. A failure of the international
community to properly respond to this situation will only create more global problems now and
in the future.

110

Ibid., 2.
Afrah Nasar, “The Problem with Humanitarian Assistance to Yemen,” Atlantic Council, May 1, 2018,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-problem-with-humanitarian-assistance-in-yemen/.
112
Ibid.
113
Ben Knight, “UN Arms Trade Treaty Too Weak to Make a Difference,” Deutsche Welle, November 9,
2017, https://www.dw.com/en/uns-arms-trade-treaty-too-weak-to-make-a-difference/a-40452550.
114
Joshua D. Sorensen, “United Nations Arms Trade Treaty: Russia’s Justifications for Abstention and the
Treaty 's Effectiveness in Application,” Brigham Young University International Law and Management review, 11
no. 2, (August 2015): 238-257,
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1136&context=ilmr.
115
Ibid., 247.
111

https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/jspp/vol2/iss2/7

12

Odey: Great Disaster

Bibliography
Alles, Larissa. “Missiles and Food: Yemen’s Man-Made Food Security Crisis.” ReliefWeb,
December 2017. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/bn-missiles-foodsecurity-yemen-201217-en.pdf.
Al-Waleedi, Ali Ahmed, Jeremias D. Naiene, Ahmed A. K. Thabet, Adham Dandarawe, Hanan
Salem, Nagat Mohammed, Maysa Al Noban et al. “The First 2 Months of the SARSCoV-2 Epidemic in Yemen: Analysis of the Surveillance Data.” PLoS ONE, 15 no. 10
(October 2020): 1-13. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241260.
Amnesty International. “Arms Control,” Accessed April 27, 2021,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/arms-control/.
Berkely, Seth. “Covax Explained.” Gavi. September 3, 2020.
https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/covax-explained.
Besson, Koumn ES, Andy Norris, Abdulla S Bin Ghouth, Terri Freemantle, Mervat Alhaffar,
Yolanda Vazquez, Chris Reeve. “Excess Mortality During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A
Geospatial and Statistical Analysis in Aden Governorate, Yemen.” BMJ Global Health, 6
no 3 (March 2021): 1-10. https://gh.bmj.com/content/bmjgh/6/3/e004564.full.pdf
Center for Disease and Control. “Early Warning Alerts and Respond Network Put the Brakes on
Deadly Diseases,” August 12, 2020.
https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/healthprotection/fieldupdates/fall-2016/ewarn.html.
Congressional Research Service. Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention by Jeremy M.
Sharp. March 12, 2021. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43960.pdf.
Cook Steven A and Philip H. Gordon. n.d. “War in Yemen.” Council on Foreign on Relations.
Last Updated, April 2, 2021. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/waryemen.
Cooper, Hannah, Colm Byrne and Scott Paul. “Funding the Humanitarian Response in Yemen.”
Oxfam International GB. October 2020. 9
Dahban, Ghulam N, Walid A Al-Soneidar and Nazar N Al-Hebshi. “Challenges of Testing Covid
in Conflict Zones: Yemen as An Example.” Journal of Global Health, 10 no: 1 (June
2020): 1-3. https://web-b-ebscohostcom.ezproxy.liberty.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=9&sid=81738868-d0b1-485eafb2-0355af863d85%40pdc-v-sessmgr02.
Devi, Sharmilah. “Yemen Health System Has Collapsed Warns UN”. The Lancet, 397 no. 10289
(June 2021): 1. https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S01406736%2821%2901197-1

Published by Scholars Crossing, 2022

13

Liberty University Journal of Statesmanship & Public Policy, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 7

Dureab, Fekri, Sameh Al- Awlaqi and Albretch Jahn, “COVID-19 in Yemen: Preparedness
Measures in a Fragile State.” The Lancet Public Health, 5 no. 6 (April 2020): 311.
https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S2468-2667%2820%2930101-8.
Dureab, Fekri, Kamran Ahmed, Claudia Beiersmann, Claire J. Standley, Ali Al-Waleedi,
Albretch Jahn. “Assessment of electronic Disease Early Warning System for Improved
Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response in Yemen”. BMC Public Health 20, no.
1422 (September 2020). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-020-09460-4.
Elsabbagh, Dalia, Sikandra Kurdi and Manfred Wiebelt. “Model: Impact of Falling Remittances
Amid COVID-19 on Yemen War Torn Economy.” IFPRI (blog). International Food
Policy Research Institute, March 4, 2021. https://www.ifpri.org/blog/model-impactfalling-remittances-amid-COVID-19-yemens-war-torn-economy.
Naqvi, Fraz. “Partition: The Only Solution to End Yemen’s Crisis,” The London School of
Economics and Political Science (blog), November 4, 2019.
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2019/11/04/partition-the-only-solution-to-end-yemens-crisis/ \
Gak, Martin. “Houthi Government: War won’t Stop Until Saudis Quit Yemen,” Deutsche Welle,
April 15, 2021 https://www.dw.com/en/houthi-government-war-wont-stop-until-saudisquit-yemen/a-57208060
Gambrell, Jon. “Here are the Saudi-Led Coalition in Yemen and What they are Contributing.”
Business Insider. March 30, 2015. https://www.businessinsider.com/members-of-saudiled-coalition-in-yemen-their-contributions-2015-3.
Gavi: The Vaccine Alliance, “France”, Accessed April 29, 2021. https://www.gavi.org/investinggavi/funding/donor-profiles/france.
Human Rights Watch. “Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During COVID19.” Last Updated, September 14, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/09/14/deadlyconsequences/obstruction-aid-yemen-during-COVID-19#.
_________________. “Yemen: Embargo Arms to Saudi Arabia.” Human Rights Watch. March
21, 2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/21/yemen-embargo-arms-saudi-arabia#.
_________________. “Human Rights Dimensions of COVID-19 Response”, March 19, 2020.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/19/human-rights-dimensions-covid-19response#_Toc35446578.
_________________. “Yemen: Houthis Risk Civilians’ Health in COVID-19.” June 1, 2021.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/01/yemen-houthis-risk-civilians-health-covid-19#
Itayim, Nader. “Covid-19 to Deal $224bn Blow to Mena Oil Exporters: IMF,” Argus, October
19, 2020, https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2151443-covid19-to-deal-224bn-blowto-mena-oil-exporters-imf.

https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/jspp/vol2/iss2/7

14

Odey: Great Disaster

Karasapan, Omer. “Yemen and COVID-19: The Pandemic Exact it Devastating Toll.” Brookings
Institution. June 15, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/futuredevelopment/2020/06/15/yemen-and-COVID-19-the-pandemic-exacts-its-devastatingtoll/#:~:text=The%20death%20toll%20from%20the,from%20the%20University%20of%
20Denver.
Knight, Ben. “UN Arms Trade Treaty Too Weak to Make a Difference”, Deutsche Welle,
November 9, 2017, https://www.dw.com/en/uns-arms-trade-treaty-too-weak-to-make-adifference/a-40452550.
Lieberman, Amy. “COVID-19 is spreading in Yemen. Why aren’t Hospital Bed Full? Devex,
July 23, 2020. https://www.devex.com/news/COVID-19-is-spreading-in-yemen-whyaren-t-hospital-beds-full-97749.
Looi, Mun-Keat. “COVID-19: Deaths in Yemen are Five Times Global Average as Healthcare
Collapses.” The BMJ, July 27, 2020. doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m2997.
Marcus, Jonathan. “Why Saudi Arabia and Iran are bitter rivals.” BBC, September 16, 2019.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42008809
Macias, Amanda This War Has to End- Biden Halts U.S Support for Offensive Military
Operations in Yemen. CNBC, February 4, 2021.
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/04/biden-will-announce-end-of-us-support-for-offensiveoperations-in-yemen.html
Mayad, Mona, Reema Alysufi, Ali Assabri and Yousef Kahder. “An Electronic Disease Early
Warning System in Sana'a Governorate, Yemen: Evaluation Study.” JMIR public health
and surveillance, 5 no. 4 (November 2019): 1-7.
https://publichealth.jmir.org/2019/4/e14295/PDF.
Med Global, Project Hope and Center for Global health at the University of Illinois. “A Tipping
Point for Yemen Health System: The Impact of Covid on a Fragile State Report 2020.”
Center for Global Health, Project Hope. July 2020
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A-Tipping-Point-forYemen%E2%80%99s-Health-System072020.pdf.
Nasar, Afrah. “The Problem with Humanitarian Assistance to Yemen,” Atlantic Council, May 1,
2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-problem-with-humanitarianassistance-in-yemen/.
Nasser, Abdullah and Fathiah Zakham. “A Strategy For SARS-CoV-2 Vaccination in Yemen”.
The Lancet, 397 no. 10291 (June 2021): 1. https://doi.org/10.1016/S01406736(21)01016-3
Nnadi, Chimeremma, Andrew Etsano, Belinda Uba, Chima Uhuabunwo, Musa Melton, Gatei
wa Nganda, Lisa Esapa et al. “Approaches to Vaccination Among Population in Areas of

Published by Scholars Crossing, 2022

15

Liberty University Journal of Statesmanship & Public Policy, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 7

Conflict,” Journal of Infectious Disease, 216, no. 1 (July 2017): 368-372.
https://doi.org/10.1093/infdis/jix175
Prasow, Adrea. “U.S. War Crimes in Yemen Stop Looking the Other Way.” Human Rights
Watch. September 21, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/21/us-war-crimesyemen-stop-looking-other-way
Riedel, Bruce. “Saudi Arabia Wants Out of Yemen”, Brookings, April 13, 2020,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/04/13/saudi-arabia-wants-out-ofyemen/.
Riedel, Bruce. “Getting Yemen’s Houthis to say “yes” on a ceasefire,” Brookings, March 1,
2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/03/01/getting-yemenshouthis-to-yes-on-a-ceasefire/
Robison, Kali “Yemen’s Tragedy: War, Stalemate and Suffering. Last Updated, September 2,
2021. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis#chapter-title-0-5
Reuter COVID-19 Tracker, “Yemen.” Updated, December 23, 2021.
https://graphics.reuters.com/world-coronavirus-tracker-and-maps/countries-andterritories/yemen/
Saleh, Mugaheed Abdu Kaid and K. Rajappa Manjunath. “Fighting COVID-19 in Yemen: The
Role of Public Administration and Readiness of Healthcare System.” Mukt Shabd
Journal, 9 no. 6 (June 2020): 1459-1472.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mugaahed-Abdu-KaidSaleh/publication/342335589_Fighting_COVID19_in_Yemen_The_role_of_Public_Administration_and_Readiness_of_Healthcare_syste
m/links/5eee2d7a92851ce9e7f4a8b1/Fighting-COVID-19-in-Yemen-The-role-of-PublicAdministration-and-Readiness-of-Healthcare-system.pdf.
___________________. “Small and Medium Enterprises in Yemen: Navigating through
Additional Obstacles During COVID-19”, 11th International Conference on Shifting
Paradigm in Business, Economy and Society: Vision 2050, Pacific University. September
2020. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mugaahed-Abdu-KaidSaleh/publication/345214764_Small_and_medium_enterprises_in_Yemen_Navigating_t
hrough_additional_obstacles_during_COVID19/links/5fa0c7dc458515b7cfb5b8be/Small-and-medium-enterprises-in-YemenNavigating-through-additional-obstacles-during-COVID-19.pdf
Sana’a Economic Unit. “Yemen Accelerating Economic Woes Amid During the COVID-19
Pandemic.” Sana’a Center, October 2020.
https://sanaacenter.org/files/Rethinking_Yemens_Economy_No7_En.pdf
Sorensen, Joshua D. “United Nations Arms Trade Treaty: Russia’s Justifications for Abstention
and the treaty 's Effectiveness in Application”, Brigham Young University International

https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/jspp/vol2/iss2/7

16

Odey: Great Disaster

Law and Management review, 11 no. 2, (August 2015): 238-257,
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1136&context=ilmr.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Services. “Urgent Measures
Needed to Protect Civilians From COVID-19,” April 28, 2020.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-urgent-measures-needed-protect-civiliansCOVID-19.
_________________. “Yemen: COVID-19 Preparedness and Monthly Report (January 2021).”
February 23, 2021. https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-COVID-19-preparednessand-response-monthly-report-january-2021.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Services. “Yemen: COVID19 Preparedness and Monthly Report (January 2021).” February 23, 2021.
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-COVID-19-preparedness-and-responsemonthly-report-january-2021.
Wisotzki, Simone. “Violating the Arms Trade Treaty: Arms Exports to Saudi Arabia and the
Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen,” Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, January 1, 2018,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep14282.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A3f42562bb5c0f
857579a2d848eb1420f.
World Health Organization. n.d. “Strengthening Yemen’s Disease Early Warning System During
COVID-19 Pandemic.” Accessed March 23, 2021. http://www.emro.who.int/pandemicepidemic-diseases/news/strengthening-yemens-disease-early-warning-system-during-theCOVID-19pandemic.html#:~:text=eIDEWS%20is%20a%20health%20facility,outbreaks%20of%20
priority%20infectious%20diseases.
_________________. “Yemen.” Accessed June 28, 2021,
https://covid19.who.int/region/emro/country/ye
“Yemen Crisis: Why is there a war,” BBC, November 2, 2021,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423

Published by Scholars Crossing, 2022

17

